b. Rejection of the Opinion

22. Against this there are many arguments.

[First argument] - First as follows: for you [sc. Henry] the two grades (perseverance and continence) turn out not to be connected, and likewise the first two degrees of the third grade (namely when virtue is imperfect or average) [nn.12-14]. I argue in the same way about virtue in the third grade of virtue, namely that someone who has virtue in the two first degrees of the third grade can be exercised in the third degree of one virtue and not in the third degree of another. For someone who has a habit of acting as regard the latter objects is not less disposed than someone else who has no such habit. So, if someone could exercise himself from the beginning about the objects of one virtue and not of another, then he will, when he has the habit of one virtue up to the first two degrees of the third grade, be much more able to exercise himself about the object of one virtue and not of the other, and so be able to acquire one perfect virtue for himself and not another. There is a confirmation, because opportunity to act on the matter of the other virtue (so as to be inclined toward it as he is inclined to what he has the habit of) may not be presented to him.

23. If it be said that, although the matter of the other virtue may not be presented to him externally, yet it is presented to him in imagination and he will have to make right choices about that, else the virtue acquired in any degree will not be preserved; - on the contrary: it is possible for the intellect not to consider the other things, but only those to which the habit of virtue inclines, for the intellect cannot understand two things distinctly at the same time, according to the common way of speaking [Ord. IV d.1 q.1 nn.22-23]. Or if other things do occur to it that belong to the other virtue, the will cannot make choices good or bad about them, but prescribes non-consideration of these other things and consideration of the things that belong to the virtue it does have. And so the proposed conclusion [n.22] will stand.

24. Alternatively it is said, and better, that a habit, however perfect it be in its natural genus, can be acquired from acts frequently elicited about the object of one virtue without the acquisition of another virtue; but the habit, however intense it is, will not be a virtue because it does not have the idea of virtue unless it is conformed to the other virtues already acquired in the same person, for the agreement of habit with habit is necessary in any habit for it to have the idea of virtue.

25. This statement [n.24] could be easily rejected if moral virtue were a per se being or per se one thing in the genus of quality.

26. But because I do not believe this to be true, as will be touched on below [nn.27-30], I therefore argue differently as follows: a virtue, when it has everything that belongs per se to the idea of virtue, is generated by acts conformed to right reason, so that the idea of a virtuous habit or act requires, over and above the nature of act and habit, only conformity to right reason. The proof is in Ethics 2.6.1106b36-07a2: “Virtue is a habit of choice as determined by reason.” But such conformity of habit and act with the right reason by which a person chooses can exist without the agreement of the other virtues present together in the same agent. The assumption here is plain, for one only rightly chooses in the matter of temperance if reason that is right and gives commands about such choices precedes. But it is possible for right command about one virtue to precede without there being any right command about the matter of some other virtue.     Therefore etc     .

27. [Second argument] - Further second: it follows from what was said [n.22] that any virtue will be the reason for the existence of another virtue; the consequent is false, therefore the antecedent is too. Proof of the consequence: for if the habit is not the virtue of temperance save because another virtue, say fortitude, is concomitant with it, then the virtue of fortitude, insofar as it is concomitant, will be the reason for that habit’s being the virtue of temperance. And by parity of reasoning temperance, as concomitant, will conversely be the reason for fortitude’s being a virtue; and any virtue generally will be the reason for another habit’s being a virtue. The consequent is false because it follows that some virtue will be a virtue before it is a virtue, and so there will be no first virtue.

28. Proof of all this.

Let us take that habit in the genus of quality which temperance must be. If this habit cannot be a virtue unless the virtue that is fortitude is concomitant with it, then fortitude will be a virtue before temperance is a virtue. And fortitude cannot be a virtue unless the virtue of temperance is concomitant with it, ex hypothesi [n.27]. Therefore, fortitude will be a virtue before it is a virtue.

29. The same point proves that there will be no first virtue [n.27]. For temperance is not the first virtue because it cannot be a virtue without the concomitance of all the other virtues possessing the idea of virtue (ex hypothesi). Nor will any other be first, because no other virtue can be a virtue without the concomitance of temperance as a virtue.

30. If it be said to this, and with probability, that a virtue can be a virtue when it has all the virtues concomitant with it, and although, in the idea by which it is one habit, it precede another, yet not in the idea by which it is a virtue; but all the habits, whether generated earlier or later, have the idea of virtue from their own nature and from mutual concomitance. - Against this: Then it follows that one act will generate all the moral virtues in their being as virtue, which seems unacceptable. Proof of this consequence: For suppose that the habit which is temperance has been generated, and consequently that the habit which is fortitude has been generated, and to like degree; eventually none of these habits will be a virtue until each habit is in the degree in which it is a virtue. Either then each habit exists before another or it does not. If it does then the conclusion is gained, namely that one habit can exist without another, and so there is no connection of the virtues. If each habit does not exist before another, then the habits will come to be at once through one act that has the being of virtue, which seems unacceptable, because that act seems to be an act of a virtue [sc. so some virtue would have to exist already in order for the act to be an act of that virtue]. And just as it would be an act of a virtue if the virtue had been generated, so it would be generative of a virtue [sc. if the virtue were not yet generated]; therefore it would be generative of them all [sc. for all are virtues together, by mutual concomitance].

31. [Third argument] - Further, third: it seems more reasonable that the species of the same genus in the moral virtues are connected than that two genera are. For one is more inclined to have an ordered disposition about connected matter (from the virtue one has) than about remote matter. Now the matters of the species of the same genus are more connected than the matters of diverse ones. But the species of the same genus of virtue are not connected (as virginity and conjugal chastity); therefore the virtues of all the species are not connected.